In my article, “Why Psychology Hasn’t Kept Its Promises” , I argued that psychology hasn’t become the science its practitioners had hoped because psychologists continue to focus on mentalistic constructs and they adhere to a methodology that emphasizes statistical inference over experimental analysis. I concluded that in order to better keep their promise of a psychological science, psychologists should return to studying the relationship between observed behavior and its context with the type of experimental analysis that characterizes the other experimental (...) sciences. In his reply, Lana suggests that there may be aspects of human social and verbal behavior that are so complex that we may not be able to carry out a solid experimental analysis, thus limiting what we can discover about our own nature. Lana concludes that the methodologies needed to understand these more complex social relationships are hermeneutic and historical rather than experimental in nature. I concur with Lana both that an experimental analysis of much of human behavior may not be possible and that psychologists must, therefore, rely on complementary descriptive, interpretive, and historical analyses. I argue, however, that the interpretive language and the historical hindsight must be based on a foundation of basic principles derived from the systematic experimental analysis of behavior. (shrink)

Anthropologists have provided rich field descriptions of the norms and conventions governing behavior and interactions in small-scale societies. Here, we add a further dimension to this work by presenting hypothetical moral dilemmas involving harm, to a small-scale, agrarian Mayan population, with the specific goal of exploring the hypothesis that certain moral principles apply universally. We presented Mayan participants with moral dilemmas translated into their native language, Tseltal. Paralleling several studies carried out with educated subjects living in large-scale, developed nations, the (...) Mayan participants judged harms caused as the means to a greater good as more forbidden than harms caused as a side-effect (i.e., side-effect bias). However, unlike these other populations living in large-scale societies, as well as a more educated and less rural Mayan comparison group, the target rural Mayan participants did not judge actions causing harm as worse than omissions (i.e., omission bias). A series of probes targeting the action-omission distinction suggest that the absence of an omission bias among the rural Mayan participants was not due to difficulties comprehending the dilemmas, using the judgment scale, or in attributing a greater causal role for actions over omissions. Thus, while the moral distinction between means and side-effect may be more universal, the moral distinction between actions and omission appears to be open to greater cross-cultural variation. We discuss these results in light of issues concerning the role of biological constraints and cultural variation in moral decision-making, as well as the limitations of such experimental, cross-cultural research. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: L'herméneutique de Paul Ricœur est centrée sur le problème de l'interprétation de soi par le moyen de la référence sémantique du monde du texte. Bien que Ricœur poursuive un examen fort important du rapport entre le discours narratif et le processus de formation de l'identité, la façon dont il prolonge cette dynamique poury inclure la question du soi est problématique. La distinction qu'il tente de tracer entre deux types d'identités, liés l'un à «ce qu'est» une personne et l'autre à (...) «qui» elle est enchevêtre inévitablement sa compréhension de la pragmatique du soi dans la sémantique de l'identité. (shrink)

Based on an 1839 boat trip Thoreau took with his brother from Concord, Massachusetts, to Concord, New Hampshire, and back, this classic of American literature is not only a vivid narrative of that journey, it is also a collection of thought-provoking observations on such diverse topics as poetry, literature and philosophy, Native American and Puritan histories of New England, friendship, sacred Eastern writings, traditional Christianity, and much more. Written, like Walden, while Thoreau lived at Walden Pond, and published in 1849, (...) A Week (his first book) shares many themes with Walden, published in 1854. Both dramatize the process of self-renewal in nature and resolutely rail against the official culture and politics of the "trivial Nineteenth Century." Blending keen observation with a wealth of perceptive and informed reflections, Thoreau develops a continuous and lyrical dialogue between the past and present, as particular scenes on shore trigger reflections on the region’s history and legends. Originally conceived as a travel book, A Week eventually became much more — one of the most intellectually ambitious works of 19th-century America, and a requiem for Thoreau's brother John, who died from a sudden illness in 1842. Of Thoreau and this work, Ralph Waldo Emerson said, "H. D. Thoreau is a great man in Concord, a man of original genius and character.... I think it [A Week...] is a book of wonderful merit, which is to go far and last long.". (shrink)

Henri Busson. Directeur : Pierre MESNARD I LE RATIONALISME DANS LA LITTÉRATURE FRANÇAISE * DE LA RENAISSANCE (1533-1601) par HENRI BUSSON Professeur Honoraire à la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger Nouvelle édition, revue ...

Henri Gouhier. APPENDICES I. La Préface du « Prêtre de Nemi » et la Préface des « Drames philosophiques » Le Prêtre de Nemi paraît en 1885 précédé d'une Préface dans laquelle Renan expliquait pourquoi il était devenu auteur ...

Henri Gouhier. VIII ETIENNE GILSON HISTORIEN ET PHILOSOPHE I. — Histoire érudite, synthèse historique et philosophie L'œuvre d'Étienne Gilson se déroule sur trois plans. Appelons- les, pour simplifier : l'histoire érudite, la synthèse ...

"Matter" may be defined, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, as "The substance, or the substances collectively, out of which a physical object is made or of which it consists". And while the O.E.D. is not the ultimate authority on words, nor is it, I believe, far wrong in this particular case. The definition is, as I shall argue in this paper, in substantial harmony with a tradition of some antiquity, according to which material objects do not constitute a somehow (...) 'fundamental category' for ontology; and it is in conflict with a more contemporary view which maintains precisely that they do. (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s “Deconstruction and Circumvention” is a sobering reminder of how far we have to go before anything like a real dialogue between deconstruction and philosophy can take place in this country. Our literary critics ignore too much of what is specifically philosophical in philosophical texts; and our philosophers equally blind when they read literary language. Perhaps it is laughably undeconstructed to make the distinctions I had just made. But perpahs, too, it is not so easy to get beyond certain (...) oppositions as is beginning to be widely taken for granted. It is surprising to see Rorty encouraging such complacency, for Rorty himself generally thinks hard and to good purpose. He is a figure of unique distinction on our intellectual landscape, a bridge, perhaps, our only one, between deconstruction and the American philosophical establishment. But for that very reason it is sobering to see how this philosopher reads Jacques Derrida: very much as a philosopher reads. The overall result is ambiguous , but is it not finally to “encapsulate and circumvent” Derrida, leaving the native speech community immune to his critique? Let us see. Henry Staten is associate professor of English and adjunct professor of philosophy at the University of Utah. He is the author of Wittgenstein and Derrida and is currently working on a study of mourning and idealization in Western literature from Homer to D. H. Lawrence. (shrink)

It was his friend Ralph Waldo Emerson, another inveterate journal keeper, who urged Thoreau to keep a record of his thoughts and observations. Begun in 1837, Thoreau’s journal spans a period of twenty-five years and runs to more than two million words, coming to a halt only in 1861, shortly before the author’s death. The handwritten journal had somewhat humble origins, but as it grew in scope and ambition it came to function as a record of Thoreau’s interior life as (...) well as the source for his books and essays. Indeed, it became the central concern of the author’s literary life. Critics now recognize Thoreau’s journal as an important artistic achievement in its own right. Making selections from the entirety of the journal, Cramer presents all aspects of Thoreau: writer, thinker, naturalist, social reformer, neighbor, friend. No other single-volume edition offers such a full picture of Thoreau’s life and work. Cramer’s annotations add to the reader’s enjoyment and understanding. He provides notes on the biographical, historical, and geographical contexts of Thoreau’s life. The relation between Journal passages and the texts of works published in the author’s lifetime receive special emphasis. A companion to _Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition_, this gift edition of the Journal will be dipped into and treasured, and it makes a welcome addition to any book lover’s library. (shrink)

It was his friend Ralph Waldo Emerson, another inveterate journal keeper, who urged Thoreau to keep a record of his thoughts and observations. Begun in 1837, Thoreau’s journal spans a period of twenty-five years and runs to more than two million words, coming to a halt only in 1861, shortly before the author’s death. The handwritten journal had somewhat humble origins, but as it grew in scope and ambition it came to function as a record of Thoreau’s interior life as (...) well as the source for his books and essays. Indeed, it became the central concern of the author’s literary life. Critics now recognize Thoreau’s journal as an important artistic achievement in its own right. Making selections from the entirety of the journal, Cramer presents all aspects of Thoreau: writer, thinker, naturalist, social reformer, neighbor, friend. No other single-volume edition offers such a full picture of Thoreau’s life and work. Cramer’s annotations add to the reader’s enjoyment and understanding. He provides notes on the biographical, historical, and geographical contexts of Thoreau’s life. The relation between Journal passages and the texts of works published in the author’s lifetime receive special emphasis. A companion to _Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition_, this gift edition of the Journal will be dipped into and treasured, and it makes a welcome addition to any book lover’s library. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions NOTE SUR G. SEBBA,"A 'NEw' DESCARTESEDITION?"* Puisque le titre du tr~s int~ressant article: "A 'New' Descartes Edition?" contient un point d'interrogation, donnons imm~diatement la r6ponse: non, il ne s'agit pas d'une 6dition vraiment "nouvelle." Le professeur Gregor Sebba a tr~s exactement expos6 les raisons qui justifieraient une "nouvelle ~dition": le projet de la Librairie Vrin pretend simplement ~tre une solution empirique et provisoire. Des professeurs et (...) des chercheurs ont actuellement besoin de l'6dition Adam et Tannery pour pr6parer des cours ou des theses ou des articles: on va leur procurer les onze 1 volumes sous un format plus commode, certains ~tant divis~s en deux tomes; avec le concours de Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, nous esp6rons que le prix de vente de chaque tome ne sera pas trop 61ev6; enfin, si minutieuse que soit la r6vision, rien n'empdchera une publication rapide. IIne peut &re question de commentaires. Mais, par des cahiers suppl6mentaires ajout6s ~t chaque volume et particuli~rement importants pour les tomes de la Correspondance, le lecteur saura tout ce que l'6rudition contemporaine ajoute, depuis 1913, ~ notre connaissance des textes cartesiens. Bien entendu, on reprendra ce que L6on Roth a apport6 sur la correspondance de Descartes avec Huygens. M. Bernard Rochot fera entrer darts les appendices tousles 616merits actuellement connus de la future 6dition critique que souhaite M. Gregor Sebba. Quant,h cette 6dition critique, elle est une oeuvre de longue haleine. I1 conviendrait, en particulier, de reviser les notices qui pr6sentent chaque lettre, d'op6rer un s6rieux contr61e des dates propos6es, de reprendre l'6dition des textes du t. X comme le demande M. Gregor Sebba. Tousles historiens de Descartes souhaitent qu'un nouvel Adam et un nouveau Tannery se chargent d'un travail aussi utile. Mais ceux que la Librairie Vrin a consuh~s ont pens6 que, en attendant, une r6-6dition de l'"Adam et Tannery," mis "hjour, si l'on peut dire, ~3tait devenue indispensable. HENRI GOUHIER Paris, France 9 Journal o[ the tlistory o[ Philosophy, Vol. I, No. 2 (1963), pp. 231-236. xII n'est pas question de r6-6diter let. XII, c'est.h-dire la Fie de Descartes par Ch. Adam. [71]... (shrink)

As a young boy, Jacques Henri Lartigue set about passionately recording his life in photographs, first documenting his domestic circle and later capturing the auto races, air shows, and fashionable watering holes of the Belle époque. His images have so bewitched modern viewers that even scholars have failed to see them clearly. In Jacques Henri Lartigue: The Invention of an Artist, Kevin Moore puts to rest the long-held myth of Lartigue as a naïve boy genius whose creations were based on (...) instinct alone. Moore begins by exploring the milieu in which Lartigue became a photographer, examining his father's crucial role in teaching him the latest techniques as well as the larger context of the turn-of-the-century craze for amateur photography. Two events brought Lartigue before the public eye in America and created the Lartigue myth: In the summer of 1963, the first exhibition of Lartigue's work in the United States was held at the Museum of Modern Art, which hailed him as an important modernist photographer, a forerunner of the art-documentary style of the 1960s. That fall, Life magazine published a feature presenting his work as an optimistic and sentimental prologue to World War I. Both treatments portrayed him as a naïve genius and Lartigue happily participated in shaping this new persona. In Jacques Henri Lartigue: The Invention of an Artist, Moore successfully challenges the Lartigue myth using examples from popular magazines and the cinema. Illustrated with more than fifty of Lartigue's photographs and drawings as well as press imagery from the period, the book offers a radical reassessment of the photographer and his work. (shrink)

Who am I, and what am I? These questions are asked through the ages, and answered in various ways in disciplines ranging from philosphy through literature and politics to biology. It is a matter of personal and practical as well as intellectual interest, and perhaps for this reason academic debate on this subject attracts attention and stimulates controversy outside the ranks of the specialists. In Identity six internationally famous contributors, Bernard Williams, Derek Parfit, Henry Harris, Michael Ruse, Terence Cave, (...) and Anthony D. Smith, discuss identity from the viewpoints of their various disciplines. The book offers a comparison and cross-fertilization of insights and theories from outside and within philosophy, shedding light on this concept crucial to the humanities and the social and physical sciences. (shrink)

Between 1234 and 1258 King Henry III, having emerged from the tutelage of ministers inherited from his father, controlled the government of England himself. Looking at this period of personal rule, it would be easy to gain the impression that Henry's kingship, in its theory, and also to some extent its practice, challenged the position of the magnates. M. T. Clanchy, for example, in a justly famous article has suggested that in the 1240s and 1250s Henry III (...) evolved a theory of royal absolutism, a theory which had threatening implications for the magnates. He has also stressed the extent to which Henry was “the initiator both of the methods and of the theory” behind Edward I's quo warranto campaign, which questioned the liberties possessed by the magnates in the field of local government. As for Henry's court, the impression has been given by R. F. Treharne that few English barons were present there, and that the king was largely surrounded by officials and foreign relatives — the latter being his wife's Savoyard uncles and his own Poitevin half-brothers of the house of Lusignan. G. W. S. Barrow has written that Henry “appeared to be excluding the barons as a class from membership of his royal council.” The question whether Henry, like his father John, was pressing magnates to pay their debts has never been investigated; but Matthew Paris's picture of the king as a “vigilant and indefatigable searcher after money” might indicate that the revolution of 1258, like that of 1215, was a “rebellion of the king's debtors.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 68J The Theology of Henri de Lubac: An Overview. By HANS URS VON BALTHASAR. Translated by Joseph Fessio, S. J., Michael M. Waldstein (Preface), and Susan Clements (Conclusion). San Fran· cisco: Ignatius Press/Communio, 1991. Pp. 127. $9.95 (paper). Except for the preface and conclusion, Hans Urs von Balthasar's The Theology of Henri de Lubac first appeared as the long essay, "Henri de Lubac-L'oeuvre organique d'une vie," in (...) Nouvelle Revue Theologique 97 (1975), 897-913 and 98 (1976), 33-59, and translated by Joseph Fessio, S.J., as "The Achievement of Henri de Luhac" in Thought 51 (1976), 7-49. The preface was added soon after for the German edition, Henri de Lubac: Sein organisches Lebenswerk (Frei· burg im Breisgau: Johannes Verlag, 1976). The conclusion was added for Balthasar's and Jesuit Georges Chantraine's Le Cardinal de Lubac: L'Homme et son oeuvre (Paris: Ed. Lethielleux, 1983). While de Lubac denied " a true, personal philosophical or theo· logical synthesis " in the multiplicity of his oeuvre, he did believe that there could he found " a pattern that constitutes its unity " (de Luhac on p. 10). A more systematic work had been planned with Bruno de Solages, Peres Congar, Chenu, and others. In de Luhac's words, " the lightning bolt of Humani Generis killed the project" (p. 11). We can only wonder at what might have been. At the center of de Lubac's thought is a spiritual perception of "the essence of Christian mysticism" (p. 11). A hook on this subject was planned hut never completed; its fundamental importance was indicated by de Luhac in 1956: "I believe my hook on mysticism has inspired me for a long time in everything I work on; in its light I make my judgments and gain the criteria for ordering my thoughts and ideas" (p. 11). The purpose of Balthasar's little book is to trace these "great spiritual options of the master" (p. 26). Balthasar wrote his preface after he had received from de Luhac the manuscript that would he published as his Memoire sur l'occasion de mes ecrits (1989; ET: At the Service of the Church (1993]). Accord· ing to Balthasar, this "meandering" text has great value in display· ing the organic unity of de Luhac's writings in the contexts which occasioned them-" as well as the legendary condemnations and banish· ments prepared for him by his order and by the Church" (p. 9). De Luhac adopted the " fundamental elan " (p. 13) of Blondel, Marechal, and Rousselot. They enabled de Lubac to see in Thomas Aquinas " the paradox of the spiritual creature that is ordained beyond itself by the innermost reality of its nature to a goal that is unreachable for it and that can only he given as a gift of grace " (p. 13). Balthasar is unambiguous in his belief in the correctness of their interpretation. 684 BOOK REVIEWS Blondel, Marechal, and de Lubac were " martyrs for truth " (p. 13). De Lubac " exposed himself to the attacks of a tutiorist scholastic theology, armed with nothing but the historical and theological truth" (p. 13). Of the three, de Lubac was the most persecuted. The conflict with scholasticism is presented in all its sharpness. One must go back to Thomas himself, over the commentatorial tradition of John of St. Thomas and Cajetan, whose work represents, in the words of Gilson, " a successful ' corruptorium Sanctae Thomae.'... Thomas has been castrated by it" (p. 14). Gilson's "unqualified assent" to de Lubac's Thomistic conclusions means much to Balthasar, because it is "the assent of the greatest authority in the field of the history of phi· losophy" (p. 15). Upon reading Sumaturel (1946), Gilson wrote to de Lubac that the difference between the scholastic and the humanist theologians, like de Lubac, in part lies in the way they understand propositions. The scholastics " understand only univocal propositions and those that seem to be univocal. The former [humanist theologiansJ, by contrast, are more interested in the truth that the proposition attempts to formulate and that partly escapes it" (p. 14). In their incomprehension and fear of analogy, the scholastics are represented as hankering after a security that... (shrink)

David Bourget has raised some conceptual and technical objections to my development of von Neumann’s treatment of the Copenhagen idea that the purely physical process described by the Schrödinger equation must be supplemented by a psychophysical process called the choice of the experiment by Bohr and Process 1 by von Neumann. I answer here each of Bourget’s objections.

Nous traduisons, pour la première fois en langue française, l’essai célèbre de Clarence Irving Lewis, « A pragmatic conception of the a priori ». Cette traduction est précédée d’une introduction revenant sur les deux moments argumentatifs clés de la refonte par Lewis des notions d’a priori et de catégorie : la critique des conceptions traditionnelles de l’a priori et de la manière dont elles comprennent les deux éléments constitutifs du concept d’a priori, à savoir la nécessité et l’indépendance à l’égard (...) de l’expérience ; l’alternative que C. I. Lewis élabore en lieu et place de ces conceptions et qui peut être entendue comme une conception tout à la fois pratique et pragmatique de l’a priori et des catégories. C’est la pièce angulaire du pragmatisme conceptuel élaboré dans le maître ouvrage de C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order qui se trouve ainsi élucidée. (shrink)

Nous traduisons, pour la première fois en langue française, l’essai célèbre de Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964), « A pragmatic conception of the a priori » (1923). Cette traduction est précédée d’une introduction revenant sur les deux moments argumentatifs clés de la refonte par Lewis des notions d’a priori et de catégorie : (1) la critique des conceptions traditionnelles de l’a priori et de la manière dont elles comprennent les deux éléments constitutifs du concept d’a priori, à savoir la nécessité et (...) l’indépendance à l’égard de l’expérience ; (2) l’alternative que C. I. Lewis élabore en lieu et place de ces conceptions et qui peut être entendue comme une conception tout à la fois pratique et pragmatique de l’a priori et des catégories. C’est la pièce angulaire du pragmatisme conceptuel élaboré dans le maître ouvrage de C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (1929) qui se trouve ainsi élucidée. (shrink)

SummaryEarly geological investigations in the St David's area (Pembrokeshire) are described, particularly the work of Murchison. In a reconnaissance survey in 1835, he regarded a ridge of rocks at St David's as intrusive in unfossiliferous Cambrian; and the early Survey mapping (chiefly the work of Aveline and Ramsay) was conducted on that assumption, leading to the publication of maps in 1845 and 1857. The latter represented the margins of the St David's ridge as ‘Altered Cambrian’. So the supposedly intrusive ‘syenite’ (...) was regarded as younger, and there was no Precambrian. These views were challenged by a local doctor, Henry Hicks, who developed an idea of the ex-Survey palaeontologist John Salter that the rocks of the ridge were stratified and had formed a Precambrian island, round which Cambrian sediments (now confirmed by fossil discoveries) had been deposited. Hicks subsequently proposed subdivision of his Precambrian into ‘Dimetian’, ‘Pebidian’, and (later) ‘Arvonian’, and he attempted correlations with rocks in Shropshire, North Wales, and even North America, seeking to develop the neo-Neptunist ideas of Sterry Hunt. The challenge to the Survey's work was countered in the 1880s by the Director General, Geikie, who showed that Hicks's idea of stratification in the Dimetian was mistaken. A heated controversy developed, several amateur geologists, supported by a group of Cambridge Sedgwickians, forming a coalition of ‘Archaeans’ against the Survey. Geikie was supported by Lloyd Morgan. Attention focused particularly on Ogof Lle-sugn Cave and St Non's Arch, with theory/controversy-ladenness of observations evident on both sides. Evidence from an eyewitness student record of a Geological Society meeting reveals the ‘sanit`ized’ nature of the official summary of the debate in QJGS. Field mapping early in the twentieth century by J. F. N. Green allowed a compromise consensus to be achieved, but Green's evidence for unconformity between the Cambrian and the Dimetian, obtained by excavation, can no longer be verified, and his consensual history of the area may need revision. Unconformity between the Cambrian and the Pebidian tuffs is not in doubt, however, and Precambrian at St David's is accepted. The study exhibits features of geological controversy and the British geological community in the nineteenth century. It also furnishes a further instance of the great influence of Murchison in nineteenth-century British geology and the side-effects of his controversy with Sedgwick. (shrink)

I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. (...) I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs. (shrink)

I'd like to say a few things about the quality of life of people like me. We can have – and now I do have – a good quality of life, but we still have to fight for it. We have to take back control of our lives from the KEEPERS, from the professionals.

At its inception, “brain death” was proposed not as a coherent concept but as a useful one. The 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death gave no reason that “irreversible coma” should be death itself, but simply asserted that the time had come for it to be declared so. Subsequent writings by chairman Henry Beecher made clear that, to him at least, death was essentially a social construct, and society could (...) define it however it pleased. The first widely endorsed attempt at a philosophical justification appeared thirteen years later, with a report from the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research and a seminal paper by James Bernat, Charles Culver, and Bernard Gert, which introduced the insightful tripartite scheme of concept, criterion, and tests for death. Their paper proposed that the correct concept of death is the “permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole,” which tenuously remains the mainstream concept to this day. In this essay, I focus on this mainstream concept, arguing that equating brain death with death involves several levels of incoherence: between concept and criterion, between criterion and tests, between tests and concept, and between all of these and actual brain death praxis. (shrink)

Richard Henry Popkin - Founding Editor's Note - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 417-419 Founding Editor's Note HAPPY BIRTHDAY TO THE JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. As I sat down to write this I realized that a bit more than half of my life has involved affairs of the Journal. So I'd like to reflect a little on what its development and success might represent. Back in the 1950s there (...) were very few programs at the American Philosophical Association relating to the history of philosophy and only occasionally would the then-existing journals accept papers on the subject. In most philosophy departments people interested in the history of philosophy were marginalized. They had to prove their bona fides by doing philosophy, not writing about the dead white males who wrote philosophy in the past. People who cared about the exact wording of classical philosophical texts were regarded as museum keepers, not philosophers. It was in the '50s that my own career as a historian of philosophy really took off with a series of.. (shrink)

If someone comes to my house, saying, "Here is a bone; I hope Obrecht likes it," I might answer with a deductive argument: "You may rest assured on that score. Obrecht is a dog, and all dogs like bones; therefore Obrecht will like it." We may formalize this argument as follows: Let G be the bone, O be Obrecht, D be the class of dogs, B be the class of bones, and, finally, let L be the class of ordered pairs (...) such that x likes y. The premises are then: x ∈ D ⋅ y ∈ B ⋅ ⊃ ∈ L) G ∈ B O ∈ D. (shrink)

The Kenya-born philosopher Henry Odera Oruka (1944 - 1995) persistently, and consistently, made proposals for a different moral approach to addressing, and possibly solving, some of the root causes of human conflicts across the world. I will call it “taking suffering seriously” as the basis of his idea of a global-level collective justice which, for him, raised the idea of the ethics of care to the level of global justice. I propose in this paper to show that this concern (...) can be found to be pervasive in Oruka’s works, connecting many of his well known positions as well as less known ones, and to discuss its philosophical merits. (shrink)

This paper argues that in order to understand West Indian economic underdevelopment, the saliency of the informal institutions that emerged during its colonial period and the effect these institutions have had on the emergence of a local entrepreneurial class can not be discounted. British colonial occupation, I contend, gave rise to two persistent informal institutions that have affected development: a belief in the ability and responsibility of government to direct the economy and pessimism regarding the possibility of entrepreneurial success. Relying (...) on Schumpeter’s discussion of the importance of entrepreneurs to economic development and North’s work on informal institutions, I examine how the poverty of entrepreneurs in the region and the cultures of corruption, privilege and intervention that evolved as a result of the region’s colonial experiences have hampered past efforts at development.Cet article soutient qu’afin de comprendre le sous-développement économique des Caraïbes, il est important de ne pas négliger la prédominance des institutions informelles qui ont émergé durant la période coloniale et l’influence que ces institutions ont eue sur l’émergence d’une classe entrepreneuriale locale. L’occupation coloniale britannique, selon l’auteur, a donné naissance à deux institutions informelles persistantes qui ont affecté le développement : une conviction dans la capacité et la responsabilité du gouvernement à diriger l’économie et un pessimisme vis-à-vis de la possibilité de succès entrepreneuriaux. En se fondant sur la théorie Schumpeterienne sur le rôle de l’entrepreneur dans le développement économique et sur les travaux de North concernant les institutions informelles, l’auteur examine comment la rareté des entrepreneurs dans la région et la corruption, les privilèges et les interventions qui ont évolué en résultat des expériences coloniales de la région, ont entravé les efforts de développement dans le passé. (shrink)

The American philosophical tradition is often portrayed as a genteel tradition that is committed to democracy and the incremental expansion of democracy through suasionist means. In an attempt to complicate this narrative, the author articulates the basic features of Leonard Harris’s insurrectionist ethics, then attempts to locate this insurrectionist ethics in the work of Henry D. Thoreau. It is argued that this insurrectionist ethos is a fecund addition to the American philosophical tradition and that insurrectionist character traits and modes (...) of comportment offer appealing resources to those faced with oppression and hegemony. (shrink)

Excerpt from Philosophie de la Pratique: Économie Et Éthique En décrivant cette façon de procéder de la réflexion ordi naire en présence de la réalité, et en en montrant l'impuis sance philosophique, nous avons, en mémé temps, 'montré déjà le caractère et l'impuissance de la méthode psychologique, appliquée aux problèmes philosophiques. En effet, la philo sophie psychologique, bien qu'elle ait été exposée en 'de pesants traités et en de solennelles conférences académiques, ne fait ni plus ni moins que ce que (...) fait cette réflexion ordi naire, ou plutôt elle n'est précisément que cette réflexion ordi naire. Après avoir ramené ades classes les images des infinies manifestations de l'activité humaine, en mettant par exemple, dans ces classes, à côté de la pensée et de l'imagination la volonté et l'action, elle considère ces classes comme des rén lités. Mais les classes sont des classes et non des distinctions philosophiques celui qui, les prenant trop au sérieux, les entend de cette seconde manière se trouve ensuite, sans s'y attendre, forcé de s'apercevoir un beau jour qu'elles n'ont rien de réel. Et alors il s'exclame, crie et proclame l'inexistence des facultés de l'âme, ou déclare qu'elles ne sont qu'un artie fice mental auquel rien ne correspond dans la réalité; ou mème il va plus loin et, en mème temps que ces fausses distinctions, iljette à I'cenle critérium lui - mème ou la dis tinction, et il affirme que toutesles manifestations spirituelles se réduisent à un élément unique. Puis, cet élément finit par ètre précisément une de ces classes auparavant rejetées: de là, la tentation de montrer les faits volitifs comme n'étant rien d'autre que des faits de représentation, ou ceux de représen tation comme n'étant rien d'autre que des faits de volition, ou les uns et les autres comme n'étant que des faits de senti ment, et ainsi de suite. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This paper analyses the concept of the Imagination of Henry Corbin (1903–1978) in relation to Daisetsu T. Suzuki (1870–1966). Besides being a renowned orientalist and scholar of Islamic thought, Corbin was a philosopher par excellence whose original thought deserves to be studied. So, I present this paper as a contribution to the evaluation of Corbin as a philosopher. In doing so, I shall shed light upon the philosophical affinity between Corbin and Suzuki, which has thus far rarely been discussed (...) in depth. Their ideas, in fact, resonate with each other—or Corbin is sympathetic to Suzuki—at a deep level, especially on the argument of Imagination, through Suwedenborgian thought, into whom both channel their interests. An exploration of this relationship of influence with Suzuki shall make a great contribution to a better understanding of Corbin’s own concept of Imagination, which could shake up our taken-for-granted idea of “imagination.”. (shrink)

I present a theory of justification for mathematical beliefs that is both non‐foundationalist, in that it claims that some mathematics must be justified indirectly in terms of its consequences, and holistic, in that it maintains that no claim of theoretical science can be confirmed or refuted in isolation but only as a part of a system of hypotheses. Our evidence for mathematics is ultimately empirical because the mathematics that is part of theoretical science, is, in principle, revisable in light of (...) experience and confirmed by experience. Following Henry Kyburg, I develop this idea by claiming that in science we use combinations of mathematical and scientific principles to develop models that allow us to calculate values that we then compare with the data. ‘Separatists’ objections to holism revolve around the claim that holism fails to respect our intuitions about mathematics, e.g. that mathematics is clearly distinct from science and that mathematical evidence comes from proofs, rather than from experience. My response to these objections is that holism can accommodate these intuitions by appealing to pragmatic rationality that, on the one hand, underwrites the special role of mathematics and bids us to treat it as if it were a priori, and, on the other, justifies, on the grounds of simplicity and success, a local conception of evidence according to which data can confirm specific hypotheses. (shrink)